A morning with the Rabbit R1: a fun, funky, unfinished AI gadget

• rabbitr1

  3 0 3.7

The repo falsely claimed to have released the code of the language action model, you can read the analysis from Retr0id here: https://github.com/rabbitscam/rabbitr1/issues/11

• CDK

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  📦 Make security testing of K8s, Docker, and Containerd easier.

  

It does show how incompetent the attacker was, I report below what Retr0id wrote in the issue:

"tl;dr: The "leak" seems real, but doesn't prove any of the claims made in the readme.

This statement from Peiyuan Liao, the rabbit CTO, is consistent with what I'm seeing here: https://twitter.com/liaopeiyuan/status/ 1782922595199033662

So the "leak" is a bit of a nothingburger, containing partial code for the relatively boring process of letting users authenticate with online services through a sandboxed browser session, from which auth tokens etc. can be extracted. You can't infer anything about how LAM does or doesn't work from this.

They likely used "kiosk escape" tricks to get code exec within the box that runs the browser. Assuming their sandboxing is all set up correctly, this isn't particularly concerning, but it does expose the code that runs within the sandbox for analysis. That's what we appear to have here.

The attacker left behind a file named cdk.log, which is an artifact of https://github.com/cdk-team/CDK/, a container pentesting tool. They were clearly trying to escape the sandbox and pivot to somewhere more interesting, but I don't think they managed it. I think "part 2" is a bluff, this is all they have (feel free to prove me wrong, lol).

But that doesn't mean there's nothing here. Lets look at what we do have.

The most interesting detail to me is a package name list in repo/ typescript/common/base-tsconfig.json

[...]

The only code actually present is for q-web-minion-

What follows is my speculation based on the names alone:

"q" seems like a codename for the rabbit device (so q-hole rabbit hole). Q might stand for "quantum".

The problem with trying to log into and interface with consumer-facing services from 'the cloud" is that you'll get IP rate limited, blocked as a bot, etc. It would make sense to proxy traffic back out through the user's device, and that's what I'd hope q-proxy is about. The big downside with this is that it ~doubles latency and halves available bandwidth, magnifying any deficiencies of a flaky 4G connection. This is perhaps partly why their doordash demo chugged so hard. (protip to the team; use a caching proxy, with SSL, MitM. Detect CDN URLs and don't proxy those.)

This is a total stab in the dark but my guess is that bunny-host is where the LAM action happens, and bunny-builder is for LAM training.

cm-quantum-peripheral-common might be the wrist-mounted device teased in the launch event.

Addendum:

It's also possible there were some juicy credentials accessible within the container. But if there were, they aren't in this leak. In particular, it looks like they're using GCP "service account keys' (/credentials/ cm-gcp-service-account-quantum-workload/gcp-service-account- quantum-workload.json), which according to google's docs "create a security risk and are not recommended. Unlike the other credential file types, compromised service account keys can be used by a bad actor without any additional information".

There isn't enough information here (and/or my analysis isn't deep enough - "cloud" is not my forte) to determine if that'll cause any issues in practice, but if there really is a "part 2" leak, I'd guess this is how they got it."

I OCR two screenshots that I did so there could be errors.

• InfluxDB

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